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Abstract: This paper examines the indefinite preventative detention of non-citizens in the 
UK, arguing that the reasoning of the House of Lords in A v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department has not been applied within the crime control context. This paper analyses the 
jurisprudence in relation to indefinite preventive detention in the (non-terrorism) immigration 
context, arguing that whilst ideas emerging in anti-terrorism law have influenced immigration 
law, in a wider context, beyond terrorism, the internal logic of immigration control which 
justifies its discriminatory coercion with assertion of the sovereign right of the state to 
exclude aliens, has caused resistance to the reasoning of the majority of the House of Lords in 
A in regard to the preventive detention of non-citizens. It contends that the UK’s reliance on 
these principles is undermined by the fact that the UK has exercised its sovereignty to 
expressly limit it through its ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
other international human rights instruments. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Democracy values each person equally. In most respects, this means that the will of 
the majority must prevail. But valuing each person equally also means that the will of 
the majority cannot prevail if it is inconsistent with the equal rights of minorities… 
No one has the right to be an international terrorist. But substitute ‘black’, ‘disabled’, 
‘female’, ‘gay’, or any other similar adjective for ‘foreign’ before ‘suspected 
international terrorist’ and ask whether it would be justifiable to take power to lock up 
that group but not the ‘white’, ‘able-bodied’, ‘male’ or ‘straight’ suspected 
international terrorists. The answer is clear”. 
– Lady Hale, A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, paras 
237-238 
 
The House of Lords found that the indefinite executive detention of non-citizens was 
unlawful in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department1 as it was discriminatory, and 
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because its discriminatory operation rendered it unsuitable as a means of combating the risk 
of terrorism. Following the House of Lords judgment, the government repealed the detention 
regime of Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, and enacted the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which created a system of control orders, which were 
themselves replaced by the less restrictive Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 
(TPIMs) by the Coalition Government.2 Yet indefinite preventive detention at the behest of 
the Executive is alive and well in the UK, as the reasoning of the House of Lords has not 
been applied in the context of immigration control. Foreign national prisoners (FNPs) are 
often subjected to another period of detention after their custodial sentence has been served 
which, because of various barriers to removal, can amount to preventive detention. Thus, 
non-citizens who are considered to pose a risk of crime, such as ex-foreign national prisoners, 
can be detained to prevent offences being committed, in circumstances where citizens could 
not be detained. Preventive detention for British citizens is possible in criminal law, but only 
if their detention is pursuant to a custodial sentence imposed by a court, such as indeterminate 
sentence for public protection,3 known as IPP. Furthermore, non-citizens considered to pose a 
risk of crime are arguably in a worse position than non-citizens suspected of involvement in 
international terrorism, as the latter are subjected to TPIMs instead of indefinite detention. 
 This article examines why the logic of the reasoning of the House of Lords regarding 
nationality discrimination in A has been resistant to the context of preventive detention of 
non-citizens under immigration powers. Section B sets out the issues and Section C analyses 
these issues and their conceptual underpinning. This paper argues that this resistance against 
applying the principles in A to preventive detention in the immigration context has not only 
led to policy effects that are indefensible in terms of risk management, but that the basis of 
the resistance is at best reliant on a false premise – that the preventively detained non-citizen 
is imprisoned within a “prison with three walls” – and at worst is unprincipled and results 
from the deference afforded to the Executive in the area of immigration by the doctrine of 
territorial state sovereignty. In any event, the current legal approach to preventive detention 
of non-citizens is flawed and is incompatible with fundamental principles such as equality 
before the law and the security of the person. 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 [2004] UKHL 56 (HL); [2005] HRLR 1. 
2 s23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was repealed by s 16(2)(a) Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005, which was itself repealed by s 1 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 which 
replaced the control orders regime with less restrictive Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 
(TPIMs) sometimes referred to as “control orders-lite”; see for example Alan Travis, ‘Control orders: home 
secretary tables watered-down regime’, Guardian 26 January 2011. 
3 s 225 Criminal Justice Act 2003 as amended by s 13(1) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 s 13(1). 
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B. THE ISSUES 
1. Not Conducive to the Public Good 
a) Statutory powers of detention 
The Immigration Act 19714 confers a wide power on immigration officers to detain various 
categories of persons, pending their examination or their removal from the UK, and 
corresponding powers are conferred on the Secretary of State by the Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act 2002.5 Where a court makes a recommendation for deportation against a 
person who is not detained under order or sentence of a court, paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to 
the 1971 Act provides for automatic detention, unless the court making the recommendation, 
or the Secretary of State, directs otherwise, or he or she is released on bail. Similarly, under 
paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 a person who has been given notice of a decision to make a 
deportation order can be detained pending the making of the order and, under paragraph 3 of 
Schedule 3, once the order is in force will continue to be detained unless released on bail or 
the Secretary of State directs otherwise. The power to detain is therefore a corollary to the 
power to deport. A person who is not a British citizen is liable to be deported, under Section 
3(5)(a) of the Immigration Act 19716 if the Secretary of State “deems his deportation to be 
conducive to the public good.” 
 Following a media furore in April 2006, when it emerged that 1,023 FNPs had been 
released without being considered for deportation, Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 
introduced automatic deportation for FNPs who had been sentenced to twelve months 
imprisonment or more. This automatic deportation is subject to various exceptions under 
Section 33, which enable the person to challenge their deportation. Section 36 of the UK 
Borders Act 2007 also allows the Secretary of State to detain a person whilst the Secretary of 
State considers whether the automatic detention provision applies, and where they have 
decided that it does apply, pending the making of the deportation order. 
 
b) Policy 
The Drugs Offences (Bournemouth Commitment)7
 
policy, implemented following a verbal 
commitment made at the September 2007 Labour Party conference by the then Prime 
Minister, provides that all non-EEA nationals involved in gun crime or a serious drug offence 
                                                 
4 Schedule 2, Paragraph 16. 
5 s62. 
6 As substituted by s 169(1) of and para 44(2) of Schedule 14 to the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. 
7 Drugs Offences (Bournemouth Commitment) vers 6.0 Valid from 19 November 2013 
 <http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/modernised/criminality-and-
detention/drug-offences-bournemouth-comm?view=Binary> accessed 30 May 2014. 
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will be considered for removal from the UK regardless of the length of the sentence. There is 
a tension at the heart of the use of detention powers, with the requirements of human rights 
standards and of political expediency sometimes pulling in opposite directions. The UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees has urged that “[t]here should be a presumption against 
detention”, and the Human Rights Committee has found that “in order to avoid a 
characterization of arbitrariness, detention should not continue beyond the period for which 
the State party can provide appropriate justification.”8 
 The stated policy of the Home Office has consistently been that there is a presumption 
in favour of liberty9 and that detention must be, and is, “used sparingly and for the shortest 
period necessary.”10 However, there have been successive moves to expand the immigration 
detention estate,11 which has increased from a capacity of 250 places in 199312 to a current 
capacity of 3,400,13 with an unknown number of immigration detainees being held in prisons. 
Amnesty International has found immigration detention in the UK to be arbitrary because 
decisions to detain are taken on the basis, inter alia, of whether a bed is available,14 a decision 
making process which they call a “bed lottery.”15 The use of immigration detention powers 
has escalated considerably: there were 95 people detained under immigration powers in 
1973,16 rising to 10,240 in 199517, and today around 30,000 people enter detention under 
immigration powers every year.18
 
In his report on his visit to the UK in 2004, the then 
                                                 
8 C v Australia, Merits, UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999; (2002) 10 IHRR 364, 28 October 2002, para. 8.2; A v 
Australia, Merits, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993; (1997) 5 IHRR 78 3 April 1997, para. 9.4. 
9 See para 12.3 of Home Office, Fairer, Faster, Firmer (Cm 4018, 1998) and para 4.76 of Home Office, Secure 
Borders, Safe Haven , the Enforcement Instructions and Guidance (Cm 5387, 2002) confirming, at 55.1.1 that 
the latter paper represents current policy on the use of detention. 
10  Government Response to the House of Lords European Union Committee Report on Illegal Migrants: 
Proposal for a Common EU Returns Policy,  
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/060804govresrretsrp.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014, para13. 
11 Fairer, Faster, Firmer (n 9), para 12.14 indicated that the Government was “considering the need for an 
increase in the detention estate to facilitate an effective immigration control and the removal of those with no 
authority to remain in the UK.” Secure Borders, Safe Haven (n 9), para 4.75 stated that “We have decided to 
increase detention capacity by a further 40%, to 4,000 places in order to facilitate an increased rate of removals 
of failed asylum seekers and others with no basis of stay in the UK.” 
12Christine Bacon, ‘The Evolution of Immigration Detention in the UK: The Involvement of Private Prison 
Companies’ (2005), University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper No 27. 
13Stephanie J Silverman and Ruchi Hajela Briefing - Immigration Detention in the UK, Migration Observatory 
at the University of Oxford 29 November 2013, 3 and Bail for Immigration Detainees, ‘Long term immigration 
detention: an expensive denial of rights and liberty Bail for Immigration Detainees’, Briefing Paper, July 2010, 
3. 
14 Amnesty International, ‘Seeking Asylum is not a Crime – detention of people who have sought asylum’, EUR 
45/015/2005, 19 June 2005, 48. 
15 ibid 49. 
16  Mari Malmberg, ‘Control and Deterrence, Discourses of Detention of Asylum-Seekers’ (2004) Sussex 
Migration Working Paper no 20, 8. 
17 ibid. 
18 A (n 1) 2. 
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Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Alvaro Gil-Robles, expressed concerns 
about the extent of the use of immigration detention,19
 
and commented that “there is pressure 
on the immigration service to fill the increasing immigration detention estate.”20 In R. (on the 
application of WL (Congo)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department21
 
it was found that 
between April 2006 and 9 September 2008 the Secretary of State had applied an unpublished 
policy to the detention of FNPs who had completed their prison sentences, under which there 
was a “near blanket ban”22 on their release, in direct contradiction of the published policy 
which stated that there was a presumption in favour of release. There are no statutory criteria 
for the authorisation of the use of immigration detention, with each set of statutory powers 
providing the authority to detain or release. Thomas Hammarberg, former Commissioner for 
Human Rights at the Council of Europe, has commented that “one problematic aspect of 
[administrative detention of migrants] is the high degree of discretion and broad powers of 
the immigration officers.”23 
 Administrative guidelines regarding the decision to detain or release are set out in 
Chapter 55 of the UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) Enforcement Instructions and 
Guidance.24
 
At paragraph 55.3A it states:  
“As has been set out above, public protection is a key consideration underpinning our 
detention policy. Where an ex-foreign national prisoner meets the criteria for 
consideration of deportation, the presumption in favour of temporary admission or 
temporary release may well be outweighed by the risk to the public of harm from re-
offending or the risk of absconding, evidenced by a past history of lack of respect for 
the law.” 
In paragraph 55.3.1 whether “there a risk of offending or harm to the public” is listed as a 
relevant consideration when considering whether or not to detain, and paragraph 55.3.1 
strongly emphasises that “substantial weight” should be given to the risk of further offending 
and the risk of harm to the public. 
                                                 
19 Commissioner for Human Rights, Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner For Human Rights, on His 
Visit to the United Kingdom 4th –12th November 2004, CommDH (2005) 6, para 42. 
20 ibid para 45. 
21 R (on the application of WL (Congo)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12 (SC); 
[2011] 2 WLR 671. 
22 ibid, para. 5. 
23 Commissioner for Human Rights, Memorandum by Thomas Hammarberg Commissioner for Human Rights 
of the Council of Europe Following his visits to the United Kingdom on 5-8 February and 31 March-2 April 
2008, Issues reviewed: Asylum and immigration, CommDH (2008) 23, para 51. 
24 UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) Enforcement Instructions and Guidance.chs 46-62  
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/enforcement/detentionandremovals/
> accessed 30 May 2014. 
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 According to the Association of Visitors to Immigration Detainees (AVID), many of 
the minor crimes committed by FNPs are immigration offences. AVID states that “[t]here are 
approximately 50 immigration act offences (as opposed to offences under the criminal justice 
system) and in 2007 900 people were charged and convicted of these.”25 In this context, it is 
perhaps significant that the Enforcement Instructions and Guidance states “risk of offending 
or harm to the public”26 as alternatives, as it is clear that the first risk may not entail the 
second risk but may nevertheless lead to a decision to detain on preventive grounds. 
 
2. Indefinite Detention as an Adjunct to Immigration Control 
a) The problem 
Immigration detention in the UK is indefinite. The UK has opted out of the Returns Directive 
which limits the length of immigration detention to six months,27 to be extended by a further 
twelve months if “regardless of all their reasonable efforts” 28 the removal is likely to last 
longer because the detainee is not cooperating with the removal, or there are delays in 
obtaining documentation from third countries. The UK has not introduced any legislation 
creating a maximum time limit for immigration detention as recommended by 
Hammarberg;29 to the contrary, the Home Office has made clear that it intends to increase its 
use of immigration detention.30 There are a number of barriers to removal of detainees that 
may arise and, in some cases, it may be impossible to carry out removal; thereby immigration 
detention pending removal can become a form of preventive detention where there is no 
practical possibility of removal within a reasonable period of time but where the detainee is 
deemed to be at risk of offending and/or causing harm to the public. 
 There is no automatic review by a court of decisions to detain, but the detainee can 
apply for bail. Section 30(2)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 provides that the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal hearing the bail application is not obliged to release the applicant on 
                                                 
25  Post Sentence Foreign National Prisoners, November 2008 (notes from a workshop) 
<http://www.aviddetention.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93:postsentenceforeignnat
ionalprisoners&catid=14:postsentenceforeignnationalprisoners&Itemid=16>, accessed 30 May 2014. 
26 Post Sentence Foreign National Prisoners (n 25) para 55.3.1 (emphasis added). 
27 Council Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals [2008] OJ L348/98, article 15(5). 
28 ibid, article 15 (6). 
29  Thomas Hammarberg, Memorandum by Thomas Hammarberg Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe Following his visits to the United Kingdom on 5-8 February and 31 March-2 April 2008, 
Issues reviewed: Asylum and immigration. 
30 Mark Harper, Minister for Immigration (as he then was), HC Deb 10 June 2013, vol 564, col 16. 
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bail if he or she is likely to commit an offence unless kept in detention. The charity Bail for 
Immigration Detainees has found that in cases 
“where the Home Office has indicated its intention to deport a foreign national ex-
prisoner, there is an expectation that the individual will be transferred to immigration 
detention at the end of their custodial sentence, and as a result foreign national 
prisoners are frequently not prioritised for a risk assessment as part of a pre-release 
plan. Post sentence detainees therefore frequently do not have access to documents 
that could otherwise help them argue their eligibility for bail in front of an 
immigration judge.”31 
Part III of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 provided for automatic bail hearings and a 
presumption of the right to bail, but these provisions were never brought into force and were 
repealed by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Without these safeguards in 
place, and with increasing restrictions on legal aid, in practice immigration detention can 
become arbitrary detention. 
 Van Kalmthout argues that “[n]o automatic right to free legal advice or 
representation…is likely to be a factor in the low level of bail applications.”32 Gil-Robles 
observed that many of the detainees that he met at Dungavel and Heathrow were unaware of 
the reasons for their detention or the possibility of contesting it,33 and expressed concerns that 
“[t]he reasons provided to detainees by the immigration officer at the time of the 
decision are at best cursory and the explanation of bail rights technical and 
perfunctory. From my own experience in Dungavel, it was clear that those who did 
not have decent legal representation, of which there appeared to be plenty, had very 
little idea, if any at all, as to how they might begin to apply for bail.”34 
He also commented that restrictions on legal aid and the remote locations of many 
immigration removal centres made access to quality legal advice and representation 
“somewhat problematic.”35 Similar concerns regarding detainees’ access to legal advice and 
representation and information on their cases were expressed by Hammarberg, following his 
visits to the UK in 2008. Hammarberg recommended that 
“the United Kingdom authorities […] adopt measures in order to ensure that asylum 
and immigration detainees are kept systematically informed and are provided with on-
                                                 
31 ‘Long term immigration detention: an expensive denial of rights and liberty’ (n 13), 5. 
32  A.M. van Kalmthout, F.B.A.M. Hofstee-van der Meulen and F. Dünkel (Eds), Foreigners in European 
Prisons, vol. 2 (Wolf Legal Publishers 2007) 842. 
33 Report (n 19) para  43. 
34 ibid para 47. 
35 ibid. 
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site, expert legal advice, so that existing alternatives to detention, such as release on 
bail, may easily be applied for by detainees.”36 
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has highlighted the problem of indefinite 
detention, observing that 
“some national laws do not provide for detention to be ordered by a judge, or for 
judicial review of the detention order. Detainees often do not enjoy the right to 
challenge the legality of their detention. There is no maximum length of detention 
established by law, which leads to prolonged or, in the worst case, potentially 
indefinite detention in cases, for example, where the expulsion of a migrant cannot be 
carried out for legal or practical reasons.”37 
 The “legal or practical reasons” referred to by the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention are various, but can include de facto or de jure statelessness and difficulties in 
obtaining travel documents, legal prohibition of expulsion due to non-refoulement 
requirements, interim measures indicated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
and a lack of transportation available to the country to which the detainee would be 
returned. 38
 
In March 2013, the government created a new statelessness determination 
procedure, but excluded advice and representation on statelessness from the scope of legal 
aid. To obtain leave to remain under the statelessness determination procedure, applicants 
must show that they are de jure stateless, and that they are not admissible to the country of 
their former residence or any other country. De facto stateless persons in the UK are 
particularly vulnerable to indefinite administrative detention – unable to obtain travel 
documents and unable to establish their stateless status they can be deemed to be not 
cooperating with the removal process. 
 Chapter 55 of the UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) Enforcement Instructions and 
Guidance does provide that release of a FNP who has completed their sentence can be 
considered in cases where removal is not imminent, although “where the FNP is frustrating 
removal by not co-operating with the documentation process, and where that is a significant 
barrier to removal, these are factors weighing strongly against release.” 39  The idea that 
detention is caused by the detainee and is therefore justifiable underpins much of the 
                                                 
36 Memorandum (n 23), para 53. 
37 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/13/30, 15 January 
2010, para 62. 
38 The Equal Rights Trust has discovered that UKBA (as it then was) considers these problems only as barriers 
to removal, and not as a basis for granting leave to enter or leave to remain, see Equal Rights Trust, Unravelling 
Anomaly – Detention, Discrimination and the protection needs of Stateless Persons, July 2010, 115. 
39 UKVI Enforcement Instructions and Guidance (n 24) 55.3.2.4. 
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jurisprudence which establishes that indefinite immigration detention is lawful under 
domestic and international law. 
 
i) Immigration detention and the second class right to liberty of the non-citizen 
In the case of R v Governor of Durham Prisons, ex parte Hardial Singh 40
 
Woolf LJ 
established the principles governing immigration detention, which were summarised in R (on 
the application of I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department:41 
a. The Secretary of State must intend to deport the person and can only use 
the power to detain for that purpose; 
b. The deportee may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all 
the circumstances; 
c. If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the 
Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation within that 
reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention; 
d. The Secretary of State should act with the reasonable diligence and 
expedition to effect removal. 
 What constitutes a reasonable period was considered by the Court of Appeal in R (on 
the application of I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,42 R (on the application of 
A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department43
 
and R (on the application of M) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.44
 
The Court of Appeal were in agreement in R 
(on the application of I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department that in arguing that the 
length of his detention was unreasonable the appellant could not rely on any delay caused by 
his ongoing asylum application, and furthermore that refusal to accept voluntary repatriation, 
and a risk of reoffending, were valid considerations. Brown LJ accepted in principle that a 
risk of reoffending could justify detention for an indeterminate period,45
 
having found in 
favour of the Secretary of State on the issue of whether the risk of re-offending was relevant 
                                                 
40 R v Governor of Durham Prisons, ex p Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704 (QBD). 
41 R (on the application of I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 888 (CA) para 
46. 
42 ibid, para 46. 
43 R (on the application of A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 804 (CA). 
44 R (on the application of M) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 307(CA). 
45 R (I) (n 41) para 37. 
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to the question of whether removal would be possible within a reasonable period of time, 
holding that: 
“[i]f, say, one could predict with a high degree of certainty that, upon release, the 
detainee would commit murder or mayhem, that to my mind would justify allowing 
the Secretary of State a substantially longer period of time within which to arrange the 
detainee's removal abroad.”46 
 In R (on the application of A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department the Court 
of Appeal found the detention of a Somali FNP for nearly three years to be lawful. The 
appellant had not been deported because he did not have any travel documents, and there 
were no airlines willing to accept passengers being forcibly returned to Somalia. In addition, 
the ECtHR had indicated that he should not be deported pending a decision in another case, 
and he also had an outstanding domestic appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal to 
revoke the deportation order. Despite these factors, Toulson and Keene LJJ gave particular 
weight to the fact that the appellant had refused to accept voluntary repatriation, whilst the 
reasons for his refusal were deemed to be irrelevant.47 Protecting the public from the risk of 
reoffending was also held to be a relevant consideration, in the words of Toulson LJ: 
“Mr Drabble submitted that the purpose of the power of detention was not for the 
protection of public safety. In my view that is over-simplistic. The purpose of the 
power of deportation is to remove a person who is not entitled to be in the United 
Kingdom and whose continued presence would not be conducive to the public good. 
If the reason why his presence would not be conducive to the public good is because 
of a propensity to commit serious offences, protection of the public from that risk is 
the purpose of the deportation order and must be a relevant consideration when 
determining the reasonableness of detaining him pending his removal or departure.”48 
 In R (on the application of M) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Dyson 
LJ held that the detention of the appellant for fifteen and a half months was reasonable in the 
circumstances because of the risk of absconding and reoffending, notwithstanding the fact 
that there was “no immediate prospect that the deportation will take place”.49 Dyson LJ found 
that: 
                                                 
46 R (I) (n 41) para 29. 
47 R (A) (n 43) paras 54, 57 and 79. 
48 ibid para 55. 
49 R (M) (n 44) para 37. 
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“[T]he combination of a risk of absconding and a risk of re-offending may justify 
allowing the Secretary of State, in the words of Simon Brown LJ in R(I) at para 29, “a 
substantially longer period of time within which to arrange the detainee's removal 
abroad.” The greater the risks, the longer the period for which detention may be 
reasonable. But there must come a time when, whatever the magnitude of the risks, 
the period of detention can no longer be said to be reasonable.”50 
 The Supreme Court held in R (on the application of WL (Congo)) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department51  that delays caused by an applicant’s appeals could only be 
excluded from the period of immigration detention for the purposes of determining whether 
the length of detention is reasonable if the appeal is unmeritorious. However, it was 
confirmed that the risk of reoffending is relevant to the question of whether the period of 
detention is reasonable.52
 
Lord Dyson linked the risk of offending to detention’s supposed 
purpose – facilitating deportation – arguing that if the detainee was to be released and 
reoffend, this may cause him or her to abscond, or to be convicted and sentenced, and 
concluding that “[e]ither way, his re-offending will impede his deportation.” 53  In his 
dissenting judgment, Lord Phillips found that the lawfulness of detention of a deportee would 
not be confined to circumstances where the purpose is to facilitate deportation, observing that 
facilitating deportation “is often the, or one of the, reasons for doing so.” Counsel for the 
appellants had argued that the risk of offending could not be the sole justification for 
detention, as the purpose of detention was to facilitate deportation, not to prevent offending. 
Lord Phillips examined the issue of why detention was permitted to prevent offending, 
provided that it had been originally authorised to facilitate deportation, commenting that: 
“[i]f the risk of re-offending can be the determinant factor in deciding how long it is 
reasonable to detain a FNP why should it not be the determinant, or even the sole 
reason for detaining him in the first place? Why should it be a pre-condition to the 
power to detain that its use is to facilitate deportation, even if this is not the real 
reason for detention, as in the case of Chahal? It is that logical inconsistency that 
underlies the challenge that is made on behalf of Mr Lumba in the present case to the 
legitimacy of having regard to the risk of his re-offending.”54 
                                                 
50 ibid para 14. 
51 R. (WL (Congo)) (n 21). 
52 ibid paras 108-110. 
53 ibid para 109. 
54ibid, para 282. 
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As it is made in passing, and in the context of years of jurisprudence which has allowed an 
extraordinary latitude to the Executive in exercise of its immigration detention powers, 
finding lengthy periods of detention to be reasonable and lawful, the admission that the real 
reason for detention in Chahal 55  was actually public protection – deportation within a 
reasonable period of time never being a real and practical possibility – is easily missed, but is 
nonetheless a startling statement. 
 Chahal v UK is remembered for establishing the absolute nature of the principle of 
non-refoulement in Article 3 cases concerning deportation to a country where the applicant 
faces a risk of torture. Following Chahal, states are prohibited from weighing national 
security considerations against the individual’s Article 3 right to be free from torture. 
However, in Chahal the ECtHR held that the applicant’s detention for a period of over five 
years following the making of a deportation order against him was lawful and the length of 
detention was not excessive in breach of Article 5(1)(f), as the Secretary of State had acted 
with due diligence in pursuing deportation proceedings. The prolonged period was lawful 
because of its link to deportation, yet Lord Phillips casts that purpose aside, considering the 
detention to be, in reality, preventive detention. 
 The absolute nature of the prohibition of deportation to a country where there is a risk 
that the deportee will suffer torture has led to the UK using preventive detention as an 
alternative to breaching its non-refoulement obligations under Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The irony of this is not lost on the Equal Rights 
Trust, which, in its report “Unravelling Anomaly – Detention, Discrimination and the 
protection needs of Stateless Persons”56 comments:“[h]owever, the problem often faced by 
stateless persons is that even though they may benefit from the principle of non-refoulement, 
the alternative they are often afforded is one which also violates their rights – continued 
detention”57 The Equal Rights Trust argues that indefinite detention is a form of inhuman and 
degrading treatment in itself and therefore 
“it is obvious that resorting to indefinite detention in order to protect a person from 
possible torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in another country is absurd. 
If the motivation to not refoul persons is based on a commitment to protect them from 
                                                 
55 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1995] 1 WLR 526 (CA) and Chahal v United Kingdom 
(1996) 23 EHRR 413 (ECtHR). 
56 Equal Rights Trust, Unravelling Anomaly – Detention, Discrimination and the protection needs of Stateless 
Persons (2010) 
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torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, the consequences of actions under 
such a commitment must not result in a violation of the same right.” 
 Lord Phillip’s judgment in WL relied largely on an expansive conception of territorial 
sovereignty. In his analysis of the detention powers under the Immigration Act 1971, Lord 
Phillips took as his starting point the contention that “[t]he Secretary of State is not required 
to permit an immigrant who has unlawfully entered this country to roam free.”58 Irregular 
migrants, including many asylum seekers, therefore do not have the same rights to liberty and 
security of the person as people lawfully resident in the UK. Although the exercise of the 
statutory power to detain is subject to the constraints of public law principles, Lord Phillips 
held that the principle of rationality does not preclude public protection being a purpose of 
immigration detention; “[i]t is rational and lawful to detain a FNP pending deportation to 
prevent his re-offending or because he would pose a security risk if at large, just as it is 
rational and lawful to detain him because of the risk of his absconding.”59 
 The jurisprudence of the UK courts and the ECtHR confirms that the foundational 
principle of the statutory immigration powers is territorial sovereignty, and that this provides 
wide discretion for the Secretary of State to detain aliens. The right to exclude from its 
territory, and to control admission to and residence in its territory, is fundamental to the 
modern nation state, and appears to create a partial shield against judicial scrutiny, under 
which a lower standard of review is applied in cases involving territorial sovereignty. The 
state’s “undeniable sovereign right to control aliens' entry into and residence in their 
territory”60 appears predominantly to trump the rights of the detained alien throughout the 
case law, at both domestic and international levels. 
 Article 5(1) of the ECHR provides that “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and 
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.” It then enumerates an exhaustive list of five 
cases in which deprivation of liberty is justified, including, at 5(1)(f), “the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a 
person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.” The 
ECtHR has taken a very deferential approach in its case law on Article 5(1)(f), finding 
detention to be lawful as long as deportation proceedings are handled with due diligence,61 
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59 ibid, para 284. 
60 Saadi v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 17 (ECtHR), para 64. 
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allowing unnecessary detention, and explicitly applying a limited version of the doctrine of 
proportionality, holding that “the principle of proportionality applied to detention under 
Art.5(1)(f) only to the extent that the detention should not continue for an unreasonable 
length of time” with unreasonableness being determined by the Chahal due diligence test. 
 The ECtHR’s approach to Article 5(1)(f) is in marked contrast to its jurisprudence on 
Article 5(1)(e), the sub-paragraph that provides for “the lawful detention of persons for the 
prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of un-sound mind, alcoholics 
or drug addicts or vagrants.” Both sub-paragraphs do not stipulate that detention should be 
necessary, but the ECtHR held in Winterwerp v Netherlands62 and Litwa v Poland63 that 
where persons of unsound mind or alcoholics are detained unnecessarily such detention may 
be unlawful. In Litwa the ECtHR found that “[t]he detention of an individual is such a 
serious measure that it is only justified where other, less severe measures have been 
considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest which 
might require that the person concerned be detained.”64 The dissenting opinions in Saadi 
strongly criticised the resulting two-tiered protection of Article 5: 
“[u]ltimately, are we now also to accept that Art.5 of the Convention, which has 
played a major role in ensuring controls of arbitrary detention, should afford a lower 
level of protection as regards asylum and immigration which, in social and human 
terms, are the most crucial issues facing us in the years to come? Is it a crime to be a 
foreigner? We do not think so”.65 
 
ii) The Prison with three walls 
A detainee’s refusal to return voluntarily to his or her country of origin is used to construct an 
argument refuting the discriminatory nature of the preventive detention of non-citizens in 
circumstances where UK citizens would not be detained. According to this argument, which 
takes a formal approach to equality,66 the detention regime is not discriminatory because the 
                                                                                                                                                        
with the requisite speed” (para 120) the Court found that the deportation proceedings had been pursued with due 
diligence and therefore the detention was lawful. 
62 Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979-80) 2 EHRR 387 (ECtHR), para 37. 
63 Litwa v Poland (2001) 33 EHRR 53 (ECtHR), para 78. 
64 ibid. 
65 Saadi v United Kingdom (n 60), Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Kovler, Hajiyev, 
Spielmann and Hirvelä, para O-I19. 
66 For discussion of different approaches to equality, for example, Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, (OUP 
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relevant comparator is not a British national who poses a risk of offending or causing harm to 
the public, because he or she could not be deported and therefore their circumstances are not 
analogous. However, where removal is not possible this argument cannot be sustained, as 
Johnston argues: “[t]he situations are only distinguishable where the immigrant is detained 
solely for the purpose of deportation. Outside these circumstances the situations are entirely 
analogous. The immigrant is detained because he poses a risk to the public, the British citizen 
is not.”67 In A v Secretary of State for the Home Department the Secretary of State sought to 
distinguish the case of non-citizens who are preventively detained from UK citizens who may 
pose a threat of terrorism, by arguing that the former were imprisoned in a prison with only 
three walls, whereas if this regime were to be extended to British citizens, they would be in a 
prison with four walls. In rejecting this argument, Lord Nicholls commented that 
“[t]heir prison, it is said, has only three walls. But this freedom is more theoretical 
than real. This is demonstrated by the continuing presence in Belmarsh of most of 
those detained. They prefer to stay in prison rather than face the prospect of ill 
treatment in any country willing to admit them.” 
 Similarly, it could be argued that where a detainee prefers to be detained indefinitely 
rather than accept voluntary repatriation and get out of the so-called three-walled prison, this 
may also indicate that the choice between freedom and detention is not a real one. Eligibility 
for the legal protection of refugee status is very restricted, and excludes many people who 
have bona fide reasons for seeking sanctuary, as MacDonald comments:  
“In everyday language, refugees are people seeking asylum in a foreign country 
because of war, civil war, or other catastrophic events in their own. It is only in the 
artificial world of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees that a 
generalised catastrophe disqualifies, rather than qualifies, a person for the status of 
refugee. It is partly this mismatch between ‘legal’ or ‘Convention’ refugees and 
‘actual’ or ‘de facto’ refugees which has allowed western European governments to 
enact ever more restrictive measures against refugees, often irresponsibly described as 
‘bogus’ or ‘abusive’”.68 
However, as we have seen in R (on the application of A) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department 69
 
the reasons for refusal to accept voluntary repatriation are deemed to be 
                                                 
67 Connor Johnston, ‘Indefinite Immigration Detention: Can it be justified?’ (2009) 23(4) Journal of 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 351, 359. 
68  Ian MacDonald and Ronald Toal, MacDonald's Immigration Law and Practice (7th edn, LexisNexis 
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irrelevant, when considering the refusal as a factor supporting a finding that a length of 
detention is reasonable. Therefore, those who would fall into MacDonald’s “de facto refugee” 
category are particularly vulnerable to prolonged and indefinite executive detention in the 
UK, as their reasons for refusing to accept repatriation are legally irrelevant, but the refusal 
itself can justify indefinite detention. 
 The “prison with three walls” argument can be compared to the arguments based on 
the state’s “undeniable sovereign right” to control aliens. Both lines of reasoning allow for a 
different set of rules to govern the state’s powers over non-citizens, and for a lower standard 
of human rights protection to be applicable in the context of immigration control. Human 
rights are in theory universal, and protect everyone by virtue of being human – they are not 
conditional on citizenship. This is reflected in Article 1 of the ECHR, which provides that 
state parties “shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of this Convention.” However, it seems that in the context of 
immigration control, states are not required to secure the same standards of the protection of 
liberty to non-citizens that they would be required to secure for non-citizens outside this 
context. 
 
3. Nationality Discrimination, Irrationality and the Principle of Proportionality 
In A v Secretary of State for the Home Department70 the majority of the House of Lords found 
that the regime of indefinite preventive detention of non-citizen terrorism suspects under Part 
4 of the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 was incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 
of the ECHR because it unlawfully discriminated on grounds of nationality or immigration 
status. As the impugned provisions applied only to non-citizens, when the threat from 
international terrorism emanated from British so-called “home-grown” terrorists as well as 
from non-citizens, they could not be a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of 
protecting the public from acts of international terrorism. There was no rational connection 
between the means used and the aim sought to be realised, hence the measures were 
ineffective as well as discriminatory on the basis of nationality or immigration status. 
 This landmark case presents an interesting analogy to the situation of non-citizens 
whose deportation is prevented by practical or legal impediments, but are detained for 
reasons of public protection under immigration powers. The reasoning of the majority of the 
House of Lords in A could be applied to such cases of indefinite preventive detention of non-
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citizens. However, this jurisprudence has yet to be extended to cases of preventive detention 
under immigration powers outside the counter-terrorism context. Therefore the finding that 
indefinite detention of non-citizens without charge was, inter alia, a breach of Article 14 of 
the ECHR, the subsequent release of the applicants, and the adoption of a control order 
regime has created a paradoxical situation in which two groups which are similarly situated 
are treated differently: those who are suspected of terrorism cannot be detained whereas those 
who are thought to present a lower, and even a very low, risk to the public are subjected to 
indefinite detention. 
 The effect of law and policy in the areas of immigration, asylum, and terrorism has 
therefore been that preventive detention of those who are considered to pose the greatest risk 
to the public and to national security is prohibited, whilst those non-citizens who pose even a 
small risk of non-terrorism related crime can be detained indefinitely on preventive grounds. 
The reasoning of the House of Lords regarding discrimination on the basis of nationality or 
immigration status can also be applied to the latter group, as British nationals who have 
finished their sentence but are at risk of reoffending cannot be detained, and there is no 
rational basis for this, given that the same threat to public safety can be presented by both 
groups.71 
 The ECtHR’s doctrine of proportionality requires that any measure or action 
restricting rights under the ECHR to pursue a legitimate aim be suitable to achieve the 
legitimate aim and be necessary to achieve that aim. Finally, the restriction of the right must 
be proportionate to the aim pursued, being the least restrictive means of achieving the 
legitimate aim.72 The final stage of this test involves examining whether the measure or 
action strikes a proper balance between the aim pursued and the individual’s rights. The 
indefinite detention of non-citizens who cannot be deported on grounds of public protection 
is not proportionate in that it is not an appropriate means of pursuing the legitimate aim of 
protecting the public, it is not the least restrictive means and does not have a rational 
connection with the legitimate aim because the threat of crime does not come exclusively, or 
even mainly from non-citizens.73 Finnis argues that the reasoning of the majority in A v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department was flawed as it was based on a mistaken 
interpretation of the Hardial Singh and Chahal principles. 74  An intention to deport the 
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detainee was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Hardial Singh and Chahal that 
deportation proceedings are conducted with due diligence, even where there is no real 
possibility of deporting the detainee in the foreseeable future, because circumstances can 
change and barriers to deportation may be overcome or disappear in the future. As long as the 
Secretary of State is keeping the possibility of deportation under review, Finnis argues that 
this is sufficient to meet the condition that action is being taken with a view to deportation. 
 In the case of A, ministers had been seeking diplomatic assurances from the 
Governments of the applicants’ countries of origin that they would not be subjected to ill 
treatment if returned. Finnis considers that the seeking of diplomatic assurances constituted 
action with a view to deportation and was being taken, as this could remove the risk that they 
would be subjected to inhuman treatment or torture. His finding that such diplomatic 
assurances and memoranda of understanding would be capable of removing the risk makes 
no mention of the findings of the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Committee 
Against Torture, that memoranda of understanding were not capable of removing the risk of 
ill treatment in the cases of Alzery v Sweden75
 
and Agiza v Sweden76 respectively, but is based 
on the findings of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission in Abu Qatada v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department77 and DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department.78 
Indeed, the House of Lords has since expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of such 
diplomatic assurances.79  According to Finnis, the impugned measures in the case of the 
Belmarsh detainees did not discriminate on the basis of nationality, because the detainees 
were wrongly assumed to be in the same position as British citizens who cannot be deported, 
when in fact they may be able to be deported at some future time. Finnis accepts that the 
detainees in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department were in the same position as 
other immigration detainees against whom deportation proceedings are being taken, but he 
believes that in most deportation cases indefinite detention can be justified on the grounds 
that action is being taken with a view to deportation, notwithstanding that deportation may 
not currently be possible. 
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C. ANALYSIS 
1. Security, Risk and “Pre-crime” 
In recent years, there has been a paradigmatic shift within criminology in which a security-
based analysis of crime has become predominant – this has led to changes in criminal justice 
policy. Zedner sees the foundations of this change in the rational choice theory of economics 
and observes that this field of economics is having increasing influence within sociology.80 
Under this security-based analysis, crime is a rational choice – the product of a cost-benefit 
calculation – and is therefore morally neutral. This view, Zedner comments, is popular not 
only because it explains the failure of the deviancy criminological model but also because in 
emphasising agency and the freedom of the individual it is consistent with the dominant 
political philosophy of neo-liberalism. 
 This view has far-reaching implications for criminal justice policy, displacing the 
traditional justifications for punishment and undermining the basis of the system of post-hoc 
justice which has been constructed over centuries. Retribution and rehabilitation are no 
longer convincing reasons for punishment, because crime is no longer seen as immoral but 
instead as a morally neutral rational choice. As Zedner points out, under a security-based 
analysis even deterrence no longer appears to be a credible justification for punishment, given 
that for some socially excluded and disadvantaged populations the unlikely prospect of 
imprisonment provides little disincentive to committing crime, because they have very little 
to lose.81 It could be argued that this is particularly true for irregular migrants, as they are not 
permitted to access employment or public funds, and are often subjected to particular controls 
such as reporting and residence requirements. Indeed, whilst in detention they may actually 
have greater access to ‘goods’ such as employment opportunities, education and training, and 
healthcare services, than they would if they were not detained.82 
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 The term “pre-crime” was coined by Philip K. Dick in his 1956 science-fiction short 
story “Minority Report”,83 in which he writes of a society which has eradicated crime by 
predicting crimes through the use of “precogs” – humans who have precognition ability – and 
then detaining the prospective offenders before the crimes are committed. The reorientation 
of the criminal justice system from a retrospective system, which investigates, tries, and 
punishes, to a prospective system of anticipating crime, assessing risk, and reducing 
opportunities for offending is a logical consequence of the adoption of the security-based 
analysis of crime. If crime is a rational choice, the state can only hope to reduce it by 
intervening before an offence is even conceived, reducing temptation, and increasing the 
costs to be entered into the cost-benefit analysis. Increasing the severity of punishment will 
only deter those who are the most risk-averse, given the low chances of being caught. 
Therefore, the state should engage in profiling of risky populations, and target them with 
surveillance and other control measures, with the intention that the profiled group will 
commit less crime because they have been made aware of their profile and the concomitant 
increase in the likelihood of detection.84 
 From the amoral standpoint of security analysis, taking pre-emptive measures is 
straightforward. However, if one steps away from this view, several distinct but 
interconnected difficulties with this approach become apparent. First, there is a danger that 
identifying populations which pose a higher risk of committing crime the state further 
stigmatises the most disadvantaged groups in society, as these are the groups which are more 
likely to make a rational choice to commit crime, given that they have the least to lose. 
 Furthermore, as disincentives are less effective on those with the least to lose, pre-
emptive incapacitation becomes the most attractive method of dealing with such groups. 
Secondly, the act of profiling the most disadvantaged has an inherent risk of entrenching 
social exclusion and deprivation, which in turn may increase the perceived risk, leading to a 
perpetual ratcheting up of pre-emptive coercive measures against the targeted groups. 
Thirdly, the act of profiling can be politicised, with popular demands for unpopular 
minorities to be profiled and subjected to ever-more stringent controls. Indeed, the ancillary 
effects of profiling of the targeted groups may increase their risk because their labelling as a 
high-risk group leads to their further social exclusion and embedding of their pariah status, 
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leaving them with few options but crime, and almost no disincentives. When an individual is 
already treated like a criminal, to be convicted of and punished for a criminal offence may be 
of trivial significance. There is also the intractable problem of the potential for profiling to 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy in that those who are the subject of increased surveillance 
and other pre-emptive actions will almost inevitably become the groups with the highest 
crime rates, because of the increase in detection amongst this group vis-à-vis the general 
population. 85
 
As McCulloch and Pickering argue, “[p]re-crime laws and the coercive 
measures that travel with them mobilize prejudice around identity and lead to intensified 
politicization of policing and law.”86 Although McCulloch and Pickering’s arguments are 
framed within the counter-terrorism context, their observations on pre-crime are pertinent to 
the wider pre-crime agenda: 
“Counter-terrorism and the pre-crime framework it animates formalizes the self-
fulfilling prophesy of selective law enforcement by embedding pre-emption into 
formal law, increasing police powers and increasing the intensity and duration of 
coercion linked to police discretion and action.”87 
 Increasing the coercive powers of the state has also been taking place outside the 
counter-terrorism context, with pre-emptive coercive measures being used within the 
immigration control context; using immigration powers to achieve a pre-emptive solution to 
crime control in the policing of non-citizens. The security paradigm is consistent with a 
utilitarian view of criminal justice in that it prioritises the benefit to wider society over the 
rights of the individual to be free from the coercive powers of the state if they have not 
committed a criminal offence, as Zedner observes: 
“although security, in the objective sense of protection from threat, is posed as a 
universal good, it is predicated upon that which threatens and its pursuit entails the 
identification, targeting, and exclusion of those deemed to threaten (Crawford, 
1998b). The consequent potential for social exclusion is exacerbated by the common 
tendency, both individual and collective, to overstate exposure to risk and hence to 
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demand ever greater protections. … a fundamental presumption of classical penal 
theory is that those who do not violate the criminal law have the rightful expectation 
of enjoying their liberty without interference.”88 
 The benefit of security for the majority is held out as trumping the rights of the 
minority groups that are likely to find themselves targeted by the state in its pursuit of 
security. In this way, a construction of the majority and minority is created, setting “us” – law 
abiding, upstanding, and familiar apart from “them” – the suspect, dangerous, other. 89 Like 
utilitarianism, the security paradigm is also vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority 
criticism. It is perhaps ironic that the epithet “security” is also used by classical liberalism to 
denote security of the individual from the arbitrary use of the coercive powers of the state. 
 
2. Territorial State Sovereignty 
International human rights law is founded on the principle that human rights are universal; 
and in becoming a party to human rights instruments with enforcement mechanisms, such as 
the ECHR, or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)90 a state 
appears to be voluntarily accepting certain limitations on its sovereignty. However, 
throughout the case law, both in the UK’s domestic courts and at Strasbourg, there is a theme 
of the concept of territorial sovereignty side-lining human rights obligations in the context of 
immigration control. In this sphere, a lower standard of human rights protection appears to be 
permissible, and the state’s “undeniable sovereign right to control aliens' entry into and 
residence in their territory”91 allows treatment of non-citizens which would not be permitted 
in relation to citizens without being characterised as being discriminatory. The alien does not 
have a right to reside in the territory of the state, and although the ECHR may provide him 
with a right not to be removed, his remaining in the state can entail some unpleasant 
consequences for him, from which human rights norms appear to offer little protection. When 
                                                 
88Lucia Zedner ‘Too Much Security’ (2003) 31 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 155, 166, NB the 
Crawford 1998b reference refers to A Crawford, ‘Community safety and the quest for security: holding back the 
dynamics of social exclusion’ (1998) 19 Policy Studies (3/4), 237. 
89 There are some parallels to be found here with Bentham’s contention that where the perpetrator cannot be 
punished, punishing an innocent person for a crime that has been committed is justified by the benefit to the 
wider community of doing so. As measures taken in the pursuit of security have the potential to make the 
majority feel more secure or at least that action is being taken to decrease the threat of crime, the detriments 
suffered by the minorities who are targeted by the measures are outweighed in the felicific calculus. See Jeremy 
Bentham, ‘Principles of Penal Law’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Russell & Russell 
Inc., New York 1962). 
90 It should be noted that the Human Rights Committee, the supervisor of state parties’ obligations under the 
ICCPR, only has competency to receive individual petition if the state party has ratified the First Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR, which recognises the right of individual petition. 
91 Saadi v United Kingdom (n 60) para 64. 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
137 
comparing this area of state activity to other areas impacted by human rights norms, this 
seems strange. At this stage of the development of human rights jurisprudence, it would be 
difficult to imagine a state arguing a defence of sovereignty in other human rights cases, an 
argument which in theory could be attempted in relation to any human rights issue. The state, 
in becoming a party to the human rights instrument, has agreed to bind itself in a manner 
which, it could be argued, is a curtailment of its sovereignty but the consent to be bound can 
itself, as an expression of the will of the democratic polity, be seen as an indication that this is 
consistent with the sovereignty of the state.92  
 The concept of state sovereignty is intimately bound up with territoriality and the idea 
of the nation state, defining itself through, inter alia, the power to exclude and include, and a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.93  Cornelisse tracks the development of the 
concept of territorial sovereignty from Medieval Europe to the present day, finding that the 
process of establishing an independent territorial state system, which began with the Peace of 
Westphalia, coincided with the development of the concept of a sovereign body politic 
uniting the ruler and the ruled, and that the two concepts fused to create the modern sovereign 
nation state. Rousseau’s conception of popular sovereignty, which according to Cornelisse 
“cannot be outdone”, accepts the absolutist nature of sovereignty which Hobbes’ theory 
entailed, but the absolute power is vested in the people, who only exist if they exist within a 
community: 
“The state is the community, but as the people possess exclusive and omnipotent 
sovereignty that is inalienable, government is merely the executor of the general will 
of the community.”94 
Cornelisse argues that, just as the general will of the community was replaced by Hegel with 
the national will, nationalism shaped the role of the State, which became associated with the 
nation: “by the end of the nineteenth century, sovereignty, territory and the identity of the 
political community became inextricably linked.”95 
 The influence of these philosophers can be seen in the discourse which justifies 
indefinite immigration detention for the purpose of preventing crime. The Hobbesian social 
contract comes into existence because people decide to give up their rights to the Sovereign 
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in order to gain protection to remove them from lives that were “nasty, brutish and short.” 96 
The security-based analysis of crime, which sees crime as a natural, rational choice, can be 
viewed as a school of criminology that has its roots in Hobbesian philosophy. It can provide a 
philosophical underpinning for the use of preventive detention measures against non-citizens. 
A Hobbesian security-based analysis may determine that aliens residing in the territory of the 
state are not party to the social contract and therefore are liable to experience the coercive 
powers of the state in order to prevent crime, but are not beneficiaries of the contract, save for 
the indirect benefit that they may derive from the state’s exercise of power establishing law 
and order. 
 
3. Slippage of Concepts 
In law, as in other areas of life, people have a tendency to introduce concepts from one area 
into another and fuse them together, as well as using their separate discourses to influence 
outcomes in litigation, policy and other decision-making processes. It is well documented that 
powers introduced under terrorism laws have been used in policing and regulating areas of 
life that seem to have little to do with terrorism. For example, powers under anti-terrorism 
legislation have reportedly been used against protestors against the arms trade,97 anti-war 
protestors,98 members of the public suspected of trivial offences such as littering or dog 
fouling,99 trainspotters, a student and a pedestrian,100 and in one case an 82 year old heckler at 
the Labour Party Conference in 2005,101 and to snoop on Council employees suspected of 
malpractice.102 Indeed, terrorism appears to have had a far-reaching impact on immigration 
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and asylum policy, with the press, politicians,103 and the Home Office104 linking terrorism 
with asylum and immigration, in some cases equating terrorists and asylum seekers.105 The 
United Nations has made reference to asylum seekers and refugees in most of its resolutions 
on combating terrorism. 106  Tumlin has analysed the impact of terrorism policy on 
immigration policy in the US context, and found that immigration powers have been used in 
terrorism investigations because they offer fewer procedural safeguards than the criminal 
procedures.107 
 A clear parallel can be seen in the UK’s formal linking of criminal law with 
immigration law under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. 
However, this provision was repealed following the judgment of the House of Lords in A v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.108 The direct import of immigration law into a 
criminal law provision regarding executive detention was successfully resisted in A, and this 
may reflect the strong criminal law procedural guarantees inherent in the concept of the rule 
of law, and perhaps an anxiety that bringing immigration law and its issues of territorial 
sovereignty into criminal law would result in a general erosion of criminal law due process. 
This would have a negative impact on the security of the individual citizen, as protections 
against arbitrary exercise of the State’s coercive powers are reduced. 
 Although similar in its nationality discrimination and consequent irrationality and 
disproportionality, the use of immigration detention for the purpose of preventive detention 
has pursued crime control aims through immigration law, rather than criminal law. This has 
meant that the territorial sovereignty discourse has prevented the logic of the reasoning of the 
majority in A from being applied in the context of the use of the immigration powers of 
detention for the purpose of preventing the committing of (general non-terrorism related) 
crime. The link between immigration law and criminal law is not formalised in the case of 
preventively detained ex-FNPs, in that criminal law provisions are not used for detention, 
rather powers of detention, which are corollary to the power to deport, are used to detain. In 
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this way, the link to the state’s “undeniable sovereign right” to control and exclude aliens 
from its territory serves to legitimise the detention and make it subject to a lower standard of 
human rights protection. This lower standard is characterised as “proportionality lite” by 
Cornelisse: in the assessment of whether a measure is suitable to achieve the aim, the ECtHR 
does not look for a causal link between the immigration detention and its aims but a “close 
relationship.” Cornelisse argues that:  
“This logic facilitates the construction of a ‘chain’ of permitted purposes, which 
renders the general rule – exceptions to the right to personal liberty must be narrowly 
interpreted – of little significance when it comes to the use of detention in 
immigration procedures.”109 
 It is thus perhaps unsurprising that states have turned to the use of immigration 
powers to facilitate preventive detention, thereby making it subject to a lower standard of 
judicial scrutiny. Moekli charts the use of executive detention, arguing that:  
“foreign nationals have always been the main target of executive detention powers. 
While states have often invoked threats of national security to justify the preventive 
detention of non-nationals, in recent years they have also relied on the far-reaching 
powers linked to the right to control immigration.”110 
 The disapplication of due process norms and human rights in the context of the 
preventive detention of ex-FNPs finds support from the security-based analysis of crime, and 
in the utilitarian felicific calculus. The citizen population can feel an increased sense of 
security because a category of ex-offenders are preventively detained, but because that 
category is limited to non-citizens, the potential damage to the security of the citizens in the 
sense of increased anxiety that one is more vulnerable to interference by the state with one’s 
liberty and security, is minimised. This use of preventive detention can also find justification 
in the security-based analysis of crime as it is premised upon detaining on the basis of a risk 
analysis, although its confinement to non-citizens is not easily justified by the security-based 
analysis, as this restriction of the use of preventive detention is not based on risk, since 
citizens can also present a risk of crime. 
 McCulloch and Pickering examine the effects of the integration of security and 
national security into criminal justice, arguing that: 
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“the move to pre-crime that is taking place embodies not only a trend towards 
integrating security into criminal justice, but also integrating national security into 
criminal justice. The shift from post to pre-crime and national security under counter-
terrorism frameworks encompasses not only a temporal shift, but also a geographic 
one that involves a blurring of the borders between the states’ internal and external 
coercive capacities.”111 
This blurring of the internal and external coercive capacities of the state can cause the further 
isolation of the irregular migrant, as the states’ inherent right in international law to control 
immigration is emphasised in its exercise of internal coercive capacities against non-citizens. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Theoretically, the power of the Executive to detain the non-citizen is a corollary to the power 
of the Executive to deport the non-citizen, and must always be used to facilitate deportation. 
However, barriers to removal can increase the length of detention of a non-citizen, which 
becomes indefinite preventive detention because a risk of the non-citizen offending is deemed 
relevant to any decision to detain or release. Considerations of public protection and the risk 
of the detainee committing crime if released are deemed relevant to the initial decision to 
detain, the administrative decision whether to release, as well as the judicial determination of 
bail applications and unlawful detention judicial review actions. 
 Arguments that administrative preventive detention of non-citizens is not 
discriminatory are based on what is in many cases a false premise: that the detainee is not in 
an analogous situation to a UK citizen who poses a risk of offending, because the UK citizen 
cannot be deported. In cases where there are barriers which render deportation impossible, the 
administrative detention of the non-citizen in circumstances in which the citizen could not be 
detained, the facts cannot be distinguished from A v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department112
 
and amount to nationality discrimination. 
 The security-based “pre-crime” analysis is inherent in the justifications of the 
preventive detention of non-citizens. This can be seen, for example, in R (on the application 
of I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,113 where Brown LJ accepted that in 
principle the risk of reoffending could justify detention for an indeterminate period, and that 
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if it was possible to predict with “high degree of certainty that, upon release, the detainee 
would commit murder or mayhem”114 then this would justify a lengthy period of detention. 
 Although the modern nation state’s fusion of territoriality and sovereignty may have 
occurred by happenstance, the role of territoriality in linking the state and the nation is key 
and has emphasised the state’s right to exclude and control aliens. Notwithstanding the 
human rights obligations of the state being voluntarily assumed through its ratification of 
human rights instruments, the sovereignty of the state is invoked to reduce judicial scrutiny 
and allow for a lower standard of protection of the liberty of a non-citizen in the context of 
immigration control. 
 The administrative preventive detention of non-citizens can be seen as part of a trend 
to use immigration law to achieve crime control and security aims, as states take advantage of 
the lower standard of scrutiny that the invoking of territorial sovereignty allows immigration 
powers to enjoy. Immigration powers have been used in criminal investigations because they 
offer fewer procedural safeguards compared with criminal law procedures. In A the direct 
import of immigration law into a criminal law provision was successfully resisted; however, 
the use of immigration detention powers for the purpose of criminal justice or public 
protection outside the counter-terrorism context has circumvented the criminal law and its 
higher standard of review by not formalising a link with criminal law provisions. Although 
the purported purpose of the detention is to prevent crime, it is authorised under immigration 
law. The use of immigration law to achieve the purpose of crime control has enabled 
territorial sovereignty principles to dominate the discourse and prevent the logic of the 
reasoning in A from being applied to administrative detention of non-citizens in the context 
of crime control. This is paradoxical because the different treatment which results – between 
the treatment of irregular migrants who are suspected of terrorist activities and those whom 
the state contends pose a risk of committing non-terrorist offences – eventuates, 
notwithstanding that in A Lord Bingham expressly stated that the use of an immigration 
measure to address a security problem could not be proportionate, both because of its 
discriminatory effect and because this discriminatory effect undermined its effectiveness.115 
Both of these reasons are also applicable to the crime control context, yet have not been 
applied. 
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 Although its confinement to non-citizens is not easily justified, the preventive 
detention of non-citizens is supported by the security-based pre-crime agenda, because it is 
premised upon detainment on the basis of a risk assessment (even if in practice this is often 
done based on out of date information on the risk that an FNP poses). It also finds 
justification in the utilitarian felicific calculus. Citizens, the majority group, can feel an 
increased sense of security because a category of ex-offenders are preventively detained, but 
because that category is limited to non-citizens, the potential damage to the security of the 
citizens – in the classical liberal sense of increased anxiety that one is more vulnerable to 
interference by the state with one’s liberty and security – is minimised. 
 It seems that arguments based on a strong notion of territorial sovereignty often 
prevent challenges to the indefinite preventive detention of non-citizens; a more realistic 
interpretation of the importance of the principle of territorial sovereignty would be to view it 
in the context of the state’s international obligations, which the state has voluntarily assumed, 
and to consider territorial sovereignty considerations alongside other constitutional principles, 
such as the rule of law and equality before the law. Territorial sovereignty may appear to 
enable popular punitivism and security-based approaches predicated on pre-emption and 
discrimination, including indefinite preventive detention of non-citizens by the Executive. 
Security-based risk analysis approaches to crime control are vulnerable to a number of 
criticisms, including that they are inevitably discriminatory and entrench disadvantage, and 
that they lead to the tyranny of the majority. If the lack of suitability is recognised, with pre-
emptive measures that are discriminatory having the inherent risk of not being fit for purpose, 
then the preventive detention of non-citizens becomes difficult to justify, even according to 
the lower standard of scrutiny that territorial sovereignty considerations entail, because its 
efficiency as a preventive crime control strategy can be questioned. The individual citizen is 
traditionally identified with the state, in the body politic of the ruler and the ruled; the state is 
often required to enable the will of the majority to prevail, but, in the words of Lady Hale, 
“the will of the majority cannot prevail if it is inconsistent with the equal rights of minorities.”
